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JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1991).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

admitting fatally prejudicial medical records which recited an
unreliable hearsay statement? Questions as to the admissibility of
evidence are governed by the abuse of discretion standard. Pearce
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989).

ISSUE II: Did Hansen adequately preserve her objection to the
hearsay in the medical records and in the testimony of Dr. Freedman
by means of pre-trial motions and in-chambers evidentiary hearings?
It is for this Court to determine whether an issue has been
adequately raised in the trial court for consideration of the issue
on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d
1040 (Utah 1983).

ISSUE III:

Was the speculation of Dr. Freedman regarding an

alleged blackout of Mr. Woo inadmissible, and did its admission
constitute fatal error?

Questions as to the admissibility of

evidence are governed by the abuse of discretion standard.
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989).
1

Pearce

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 7 03:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing- If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (4):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:

(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (6):
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.
A
memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis,
made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness. The term "business" us used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the
hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided
in these rules.
2

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff and appellant Gail 0. Hansen ("Ms. Hansen") brought
this action in the Third Judicial District Court to recover
compensation

for

injuries

she

sustained

as

a

result

of

an

automobile collision. Ms. Hansen's vehicle was struck from behind
by a vehicle driven by James Woo ("Woo") , who died during the
pendency of this action of causes unrelated to the collision.

(R.

at 3, 12, 97-99.) The case resulted in a jury verdict of no cause
of action.

(R. 463-464.)

Statement of Facts

1.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the statement of

facts from her priniple brief as if fully set forth.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff/appellant Gail O. Hansen respectfully requests this
court to reverse the judgment entered against her and remand for a
new trial, because the trial court erred in admitting impermissible
hearsay evidence addressing the cause of the collision, through
medical records and speculative medical testimony based upon this
hearsay.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

INADMISSABLE

HEARSAY

ADMITTED

TO

PLAINTIFF'S

SUBSTANTIAL

PREJUDICE: The hearsay statement reportedly made by the defendant,
that he had suffered a momentary black-out, was first made long
after the collision, so as to raise grave suspicions of fabrication
or misstatement.

Defendant's ambiguous statement, as reported in

the medical records, is impermissible hearsay because it was not
within any exception to the hearsay rule and thus the trial court
should have excluded it.

If this hearsay statement, and all

speculation based upon it, were properly excluded, then likewise,
the medical testimony of Dr. Freedman about the alleged blackout
should properly have been excluded so as to avoid allowing in
inadmissible hearsay and speculation regarding the alleged blackout.

POINT I.
THE HEARSAY IN WOO'S MEDICAL RECORDS RELATING
TO HIS ALLEGED BLACK-OUT IS INADMISSIBLE
AND ITS ADMISSIONS RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE TO HANSEN, AND WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR

To make Defendant Woo's hearsay statement admissible for its
truth, defendant must establish that the statement came within one
of the narrow

exceptions

to the hearsay

rule.

Hansen has

discussed, in her principle brief, the reasons why the statement
4

does not come within the exception offered by Rule 803 (4) of the
Utah Rule of Evidence ("U.R.E."), which allows hearsay statements
which were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.

In

this section she will briefly respond to the arguments raised by
defendant

as to why he believes

this exception

should

apply.

Further, Hansen will reply to defendant's arguments that Rule 803
(6) of the U.R.E. should be applicable to allow the records at
issue into evidence.
A. The Statement Allegedly Made by Woo Was Not
For Purposes of Diagnosis or Treatment, But
Was Merely Exculpatory, and So It Should Not
Be Allowed Into Evidence Under Rule 803 (4)

The hearsay statement allegedly made by Woo nearly an hour
after the collision, at the hospital, appears on its face as an
attempt to explain what had happened, rather than a statement to a
medical

professional

for purposes

of

diagnosis

or

treatment.

Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 12, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "A", reflects that Woo reportedly
driving

and

suddenly

lost

consciousness

stated

that

[without]

"he was
warning.

Remembers nothing until a lady was pulling him from his car."
This statement, on its face, appears to be a response to a
question
occur?"

such

as

"what happened?" or

"how did

this

collision

An answer to this type of question does not qualify as a

statement to a medical professional for purposes of diagnosis or
treatment, and the trial court should properly have excluded it.

5

Numerous courts have interpreted rules of evidence in other
jurisdictions which are identical to Utahfs Rule 803 (4) not to
allow statements made for the purpose of explaining the cause of
the injury or incriminating the person or force responsible for the
accident.

In addition to those cases and authorities cited in

Hansen's principle brief, the case of Hatfield v. Andermatt, 561
N.E.2d 1023 (Ohio App. 1988) is relevant.

In Hatfield the Ohio

Court of Appeals, in interpreting Ohio's version of Rule 803 (4),
held that a "statement in a hospital or emergency squad record
regarding the cause of the injury or the manner in which the
accident happened are not admissible insofar as they are not
pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient, [emphasis
added.]"

Id. at 1026. (citing McQueen v. Goldey 484 N.E.2d 712

(Ohio App. 1984)).
The rationale underlying the exception found at Rule 803 (4)
is stated to be the presumption that "the particular facts relied
on will be trustworthy because the integrity and specialized skill
of the expert will keep him or her from basing his or her opinion
on questionable matter.

The right to cross-examine the expert

reinforces the probability of reliability."

State v. Schreuder,

726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) (commenting on Rule 703 and Rule 803
(4)).
The rationale stated by the Schreuder court is inapplicable
here. The expert who testified at the trial, Dr. Freedman, was not
the doctor (expert) who had examined Woo, treated him and recorded
his hearsay statement.

Dr. Freedman had never seen nor treated
6

Woo.

He was hired by the defendant merely to review the medical

records and determine whether the alleged "black-out," assuming it
occurred, was foreseeable.

The first premise of the rationale

stated by the Schreuder Court is inapplicable where the testifying
expert is not the doctor (expert) who treated and assessed the
hearsay declarant, and recorded the hearsay statement.

For this

reason, Schreuder is not persuasive here.
Defendant, in his brief, insinuates that Hansen could have
called Dr. Scovill, Woo's treating physician and allegedly the
person who recorded the hearsay statement. Dr. Scovill was unable
to testify at trial. Defense counsel Roger Bullock was unsuccesful
in his attempts to locate Dr. Scovill, and thus was forced to hire
Dr. Freedman.
Consequently, Hansen had no opportunity to call and incisively
cross-examine Dr. Scovill as to the exact nature of the statement
which she allegedly heard from Woo, and so the second premise of
the rationale proposed by the Schreuder court is inapplicable also.
Cross-examination of a "second hand" expert who is unfamiliar with
the patient and his communication abilities and difficulties cannot
replace the right to question either the hearsay declarant, Woo,
or,

at

the

least,

Dr.

Scovill, who

recorded

the

hearsay.

Naturally, it follows that where the elements of the rationale for
Rule 803 (4) under Schreuder are not applicable, the trial court
should not have admitted the challenged evidence under Rule 803(4).
The hospital records which contain the hearsay and speculation
regarding Woo's alleged "black-out" are inadmissible and the trial
7

court should not have allowed them to come into evidence.

This

error completely foreclosed Hansen's recovery for her injuries
occasioned

by Woo's negligence-

Their admission

clearly is

reversible error as they worked a fatal prejudice to Hansen's
rights.

B.
The Records Containing Woo's Hearsay
Statements Are Not Admissible Under Rule 803
(6) as the Source of the Information Contained
Therein Indicates A Lack of Trustworthiness

In

his

brief,

defendant

raises

the

argument

that

the

questioned hospital records should be admissible pursuant to U,R,E.
Rule 803

(6).

This rule allows regularly kept records of a

business, here a hospital, to be admissible despite the hearsay
rule.

Defendant argues that the requirements of Rule 803 (6) are

met, in that Dr. Freedman was a "qualified witness" to testify that
the records were "kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity" to make those records.
is

arguable,

however,

that

a

doctor

(See Rule 803 (6)). It
from

one

hospital

is

"qualified" to authenticate another hospital's records.
Beyond

the question

of whether defendant

laid

a proper

foundation under Rule 803 (6), clearly the court should not have
permitted these records under provision (6) of Rule 803, which
provides that if the "source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness" the
records should be excluded, even if they are otherwise business
8

records as defined by Rule 803 (6) . In the instant case, there is
obvious "lack of trustworthiness" in the "source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation".
As discussed at length in Hansen's principle brief, Woo was
elderly, somewhat infirm and not fluent in English.

He was

suffering from the shock and confusion of a severe automobile
collision when he allegedly made his statement, almost one hour
after the collision.

One hour is ample time in which to fabricate

an explanation for his negligence.

Clearly these facts taken

together constitute a "lack of trustworthiness" in the "source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation".
Compounding the fact that the accuracy in the transmission of
the statement was questionable, there is the fact that only Dr.
Scovill, the treating physician, knew if the remark was in response
to a question. Only Dr. Scovill could assess whether the "failure
to

remember"

anything

was

a

result

of

retrograde

amnesia

attributable to the crash, or reflected a momentary distraction
because of Woo's other health problems, or arose from any of a
myriad of other reasons.

In any of these instances, Woo would be

liable and Hansen would recover.
Because of the unavailability of Dr. Scovill, the hearsay
remark is hearsay within hearsay, or double hearsay —

Woo's

alleged statement as one level of hearsay, and Dr. Scovillfs
recordation of the statement in the medical records as the second
level.

Neither of the hearsay declarants was available to be put

under oath, or cross-examined on the details of Woo's statements.
9

Rule 805 of the U.R.E. allows that "[hjearsay included within
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule
provided in these rules."

[Emphasis added.]

Assuming arguendo

that the hearsay from Dr. Scovill was admissible, Woo's selfserving statements were not. Consequently, the trial court should
have excluded the hearsay and speculation in the medical records
about Woo's alleged "black-out" should have been excluded.
trial

court's

failure

to

exclude

this

evidence

The

constitutes

reversible error.

POINT II.
THERE IS NO WAIVER OF OBJECTION WHERE PLAINTIFF MADE
A MOTION IN LIMINE FOR A RULING ON THE QUESTIONED
EVIDENCE, AND WHERE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS HELD
BEFORE THE JUDGE WHICH PRESIDED OVER THE TRIAL

Defendant cites a number of cases for the proposition that an
objection to evidence must be raised at trial or be waived.
Plaintiff

does

not

dispute

this.

Plaintiff

does

dispute

defendant's contention that a pre-trial motion is inadequate to
preserve a party's objection to evidence.

The rule from the case

cited by defendant as support for this proposition, State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), was limited by this Court to
situations wherein the party made a pre-trial motion to exclude
evidence before a law and motion judge, and then failed to raise
the same objection later, before the trial judge.

10

State v.

Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1987).

(See also State v.

Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App. 1988).)
Defendant also cites Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d
832 (Utah 1984) as support for his argument that plaintiff waived
her objection to the disputed evidence. Barson is distinguishable
in that the party objecting to the evidence based his objection on
one ground, but failed to adequately raise an argument as to the
other ground before the trial court. Consequently, the trial court
did not have an opportunity to rule with finality on that issue, so
an appeal could not be predicated on that basis.
This Court's rule in Johnson is controlling. The facts of the
instant case reflect that Plaintiff Hansen made numerous pre-trial
motions, including a Motion to Strike [R. 100-114], a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [R.275-319] (which Motion was admittedly
not considered by the Court due to Rule 4-501 (3) (g) of the Code
of Judicial Administration) and a Motion in Limine [R. 336-353],
all before the trial judge.
challenged

evidence

from

Plaintiff obtained rulings on the
the

trial

court.

Consequently,

plaintiff's objections to the records containing the inadmissible
hearsay, and to the speculations in Dr. Freedman's testimony, are
preserved.
Beyond

the

fact that plaintiff adequately

preserved

her

objections by means of a pre-trial Motion to Strike, Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine, plaintiff reasserted
her

objections during

chambers.

the trial, at evidentiary

[R. 485-494, 555-559]

hearings

in

In a conference before the trial

11

judge on April 1, 1992, the second day of the trial, plaintiff's
counsel

argued

and

offered

supporting

authorities

for

the

proposition that "the Interrogatories...and the Declaration of Mr.
Woo do not fit under any exception to the hearsay rule".
486]

[R. 485-

Further, on April 2, 1992, plaintiff's counsel again argued

the trial court must exclude the testimony of Dr. Freedman and the
references to an alleged "black-out."

He argued such testimony

and/or references to questionable statements should not be allowed
"to come in through the [hospital] records that the Defendant
stated at the hospital to someone that he had experienced a sudden
loss of consciousness."

[R. 555] On both occassions, plaintiff's

counsel went on to argue that the hearsay exceptions discussed in
the briefs before this Court do not permit admission of such
speculative and questionable hearsay.
It is abundantly clear that plaintiff repeatedly reaffirmed
her objection to the "black out" hearsay statements of Woo and to
the speculative medical testimony arising from this hearsay.
trial

court

admitted

the

evidence,

prejudiced Hansen's rights.

and

in

so

doing

The

fataly

This Court needs to rectify these

errors by a reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial.

POINT III.
THE INADMISSIBLE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL
HEARSAY CONTAINED IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO BE
REPEATED FOR ITS TRUTH BY DR. FREEDMAN
The error of which plaintiff complains, the admission of
highly prejudicial hearsay, was not harmless error.
12

If the trial

court had correctly ruled on plaintiff's objections to the hearsay
statements, then necessarily

the court would have needed to

reconsider plaintiff's objection to the testimony of Dr. Freedman.
An order should properly have been issued excluding any speculative
opinion based on assumptions derived from the inadmissible hearsay,
as discussed below.
To prevail on appeal plaintiff must show:

1. that the error

complained of was substantial and prejudicial error; and 2. that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different without it.
P.2d 240 (Utah 1965).)

(See Bowden v. Denver and R.G.W.R.R., 2 68
Plaintiff has certainly established the

substantial and prejudicial nature of the error, in that it
precluded plaintiff's constitutional right to cross-examination and
this was fatal to plaintiff's entire claim.

The conclusion that

the result would have been different without the disputed evidence
is inescapable.

Considering the fact that without the hearsay in

the medical records, and without the speculative testimony of Dr.
Freedman arising directly and improperly from that hearsay, there
would have been no defense to Hansen's claims, thus Hansen would
have prevailed.
It is true that U.R.E. Rule 703 allows an expert to base his
opinions on evidence which need not be admissible in evidence. One
must

approach

this

rule

with

caution,

however,

to

avoid

eviscerating the purpose and intent of the hearsay rule by allowing
all hearsay and other inadmissible evidence to come into evidence
through expert testimony. Experts, by virtue of the fact that they
13

are knowledgeable in a particular field and well educated, are
generally accorded great respect by the jury.

In most cases their

opinions are given more weight than the opinions of lay witnesses.
If experts are allowed unrestricted license to base opinions on
otherwise

inadmissible evidence, and to state to the jury the

foundations for those opinions, it is highly likely that a jury
will accept the expert's opinions.

In such a case impermissible,

highly prejudicial hearsay evidence will be the primary evidence
upon which the jury bases its decision, as occurred in this case.
The text of Rule 703 provides that an expert may base his
opinions upon inadmissible matter if "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field".

Dr. Freedman testified

that his opinions were based on the sort of records and materials
of the type reasonably relied upon by physicians.

[R. 506]

It has

been held, however, that the question of "[w]hether the underlying
evidence is reasonably relied on for purposes of rule 703 is an
issue for the trial judge.

The expert's own testimony regarding

reasonable reliance is not conclusive, being only on factor in the
consideration."

Brunner v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Iowa 1992).

(Citing D. Binder Hearsay Handbook, § 103 at 457 (1983); Supp. at
267.) (Accord City of Chicago v. Anthony. 554 N.E.2d 1381, 1388
(111.

1990);

Zenith

Radio

Corporation

v.

Matsushita

Electric

Industrial Co., Ltd,, et al., 505 F.Supp 1313, 1325 (D.C. Penn,
1981).)
In

this

case,

the

underlying

evidence

which

led

to

Dr.

Freedman1s opinion regarding the alleged "black-out" was of highly
14

questionable origin, considering the circumstances under which it
was made. It is for the Court to determine whether, under all the
circumstances, it was reasonable for Dr. Freedman to rely on this
questionable evidence in reaching his opinion.
The court in Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd., et al., 505 F.Supp 1313 (D.C. Penn, 1981)
delineated six factors which should go into determining whether the
expert reasonably relied on otherwise inadmissible materials in
reaching his opinion.

Id at 13 30.

When these factors are

referenced against the facts of this case, it becomes apparent that
Dr. Freedman1s reliance on the otherwise inadmissible hearsay
statements of Woo was not reasonable, thus his testimony relating
to Woo's alleged "black-out" was inadmissible. The six factors are
the extent to which:
1.

The

opinion

is dominated

by

reliance

judicially determined to be inadmissible.

on materials

If the court had

correctly ruled on Hansen's objection to the admissibility of the
medical records containing Woo's hearsay statement, Dr. Freedman's
testimony with regard to Woo's alleged "black-out" would have been
based almost exclusively on materials which had been judicially
determined to be inadmissible;
2.

The

opinion

is

dominated

by

reliance

upon

other

untrustworthy materials. The remainder of Dr. Freedman's testimony
regarding the alleged "black-out" would have necessarily been based
on untrustworthy speculation after the exclusion of the hearsay in
the medical records;
15

3.

The

expert's

assumptions

unsupported or speculative.

have

been

shown

to

be

Dr. Freedman repeatedly stated in

deposition testimony that he was merely "assuming he [Woo] blacked
out," and that he was then asked, based upon this assumption,
whether "there was any way of anticipating that."

[R. 342, 347]

It is evident under point three that Dr. Freedman's "assumptions
have been shown to be unsupported [or] speculative";
4.

The materials on which the expert relied are within his

immediate sphere of expertise. It is conceded that Dr. Freedman is
an expert in the field of heart disorders and arrhythmias, but
nowhere in his testimony or credentials does he claim to specialize
in syncopathic episodes like that alleged here, other than when
they arise from heart disorders.

While this clearly does not

disqualify Dr. Freedman as an expert to testify to such matters, it
does go to consideration raised by the Court in Zenith as to
whether the matters testified to were within his immediate sphere
of expertise;
5.

The expert acknowledges the questionable reliability of

the underlying information, indicating he has factored that into
his consideration (the court noted in a footnote that this factor
would be used only in close cases, as a true "hired gun" could
always surmount it) .

Since this point is only to be used in

limited cases, it is not considered here;
6.

Reliance on certain materials, which might otherwise be

reasonable, would be unreasonable on the facts of the particular
case.

As discussed at length above, the hearsay statements of Woo
16

are of questionable veracity, and they were fatally damaging to
Hansen's case.

When taken in the context of speculation as to

whether Woo did in fact suffer a "black-out," reliance on this sort
of self-serving, exculpatory statement is unreasonable.
When the factors stated by the Zenith court are considered, it
is clear that the hearsay statements relied upon by Dr. Freedman in
reaching his opinions were not "reasonably relied upon," and should
therefore not be considered within U.R.E. Rule 703. Consequently,
the trial court should have excluded the testimony of Dr. Freedman
speculating as to whether Woo suffered a "black-out" and whether
any such "black-out" was foreseeable. Hansen respectfully requests
this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
the case for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial because:

1.

Erroneously admitted evidence is an adequate grounds upon

which to base a reversal, since the evidence "had a substantial
influence in bringing about the verdict";

2.

The hearsay statement of Defendant Woo was inadmissible.

It did not come within the exceptions provided by either Rule 803
(4) or 803 (6);
17

3.

Hansen did not waive her objection to the evidence where

it was timely and specifically objected to both before and during
trial;

4.

The trial court should have excluded the speculations of

Dr. Freedman's testimony, as it was based on inadmissible hearsay.
The trial court should not have allowed this hearsay into evidence
by an alternate means when it should properly have been excluded in
all respects.

Respectfully submitted this

£L>

day of November, 1992.

SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

John farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Gail 0. Hansen
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